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Daye: Justice Byron R. White

JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE
CHARLES

E.

DAYE* t

It is propitious that today we discuss the question of equal protection, for we do so at a time of dangerous undercurrents in the continuing ebb and flow of America's relationship with its black constituency.
We dedicate today a new structure that symbolizes this institution-an
institution whose roots run deep into the tortured past, an institution
which was conceived in a dark era of the struggle of black Americans
to achieve equality.'
When I was honored by being asked to prepare remarks for this occasion and chose Justice White as the subject of discussion, I was humbled in the knowledge that scholars devote years, even lifetimes, to such
pursuits. After I commenced my study, I thought that I might have
respectfully declined the honor and opportunity if only I had exhibited
less courage, or possessed more sense. It is difficult, if not impossible,
to know the mind of a man; I deal with his work.2 It is difficult, if not
impossible, to know the extent to which an opinion by a Justice of the
Supreme Court represents his personal views or represents a compromise and consensus among the Justices.' Nevertheless, I take Justice
White's opinions at face value.
I do not, however, take a fragmented view of Justice White's work as
a Supreme Court Justice. I see his opinions in a holistic context, as part
of the ongoing work of the Supreme Court, and I see the work of the
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; Visiting Professor of Law,
North Carolina Central University, 1980-81; B.A., North Carolina Central University, 1966; J.D.,
Columbia University, 1969.
t Shortly before this volume went to press, Professor Daye was named Dean of the North
Carolina Central University Law School.
I. North Carolina Central University School of Law was founded in 1939, but today, as in
the past, we perceive that this law school is imperiled. As this institution tries to ward off the
forces that would take away the opportunity it offers to the sons and daughters of slave ancestors
and attempts to assuage those people who wrongly expect instant miracles, the question of equal
protection is especially poignant. The plight of this institution mirrors the plight of black Americans at large. It symbolizes the continuing struggle in a concrete way.
2. And that only in a very limited sense. Justice White is a man of varied background and
experience. He is clearly blessed with a keen, if not indeed a brilliant mind, as evidenced by his
biographical sketch. His record is replete with intellectual and physicial excellence. See generaly
C. BARNES, MEN OF THE SUPREME COURT: PROFILES OF THE JUSTICES (1978); Israel, Byron R.
White, in IV THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 1789-1969, at 2951 (L.
Friedman & F. Israel eds. 1969). Moreover, this discussion encompasses the narrow range of his
opinions dealing with equal protection and race.
3. See, e.g., R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 657-99 (1976).
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Supreme Court itself as part of the multi-textured mosaic of the nation's whole socio-political montage. The work of any particular Justice must be understood to be part of a larger whole that helps shape
the evolution of the Supreme Court as it undertakes its proper role in
our governmental system.
There are four strands of thought which converge in these views.
First, I examine several paradoxes and ironies that I perceive. Second,
I emphasize that the quest for equality by black Americans is ongoing
because it remains unreached. Third, as the first two strands of analysis proceed, I analyze Justice White's views as expresed in his opinions.
Fourth, I note the implications for the future that I believe flow from
this analysis and suggest issues which I think provide grist for future
advocates and analysts.
The ConstitutionalPremises
Justice Holmes observed that "[tihe life of the law has not been logic:
it has been experience." 4 This idea of an experientially grounded jurisprudence of the Constitution might best explain the Supreme Court's
acceptance of social scientists' data as one of the premises which underlies the great decision of Brown v. Board of Education.5 The data
presented in Brown demonstrated that the "equal" part of the "separate
but equal" theorem of Plessy v. Ferguson6 was unrealized. After decades of legal and social struggle, Plessy's "equal" thrust had proven
impossible to implement. The result was a socially mean and degrading system for black Americans that demeaned the spirit of the American social experiment.7
We who applauded the Brown decision should nevertheless be cautioned. Professor Wechsler, in his insightful analysis, searches the
Brown decision in vain for "neutral principles" of constitutional pol4. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).

5. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). "We must consider public education in the light of its full development and its present place in American life throughout the Nation. Only in this way can it be
determined if segregation in public schools deprives those plaintiffs of equal protection of the
laws." Id. at 492-93.
6. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). "'When the government, therefore, has secured to each of its citizens equal rights before the law and equal opportunities for improvement and progress, it has
accomplished the end for which it was organized and performed all of the functions respecting
social advantages with which it is endowed.'" Id. at 551, (quoting People v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y.
438, 448 (1885)).
7. The American social experiment can best be characterized as that great exchange which
takes place among the many diverse cultures of this melting pot we call a nation. Many people
from many different countries had come together as one, but the black man was not to share in
this exchange. This injustice remained evident after the unsuccessful implementation of Plessy's
"separate but equal" standard. For an excellent examination of the historical developments that
followed Plessy and led up to Brown, see R. KLUGER, supra note 3.
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icy-making.8 Professor Wechsler is assuredly correct in his view that
constitutional analysts should not be willing to discard the noble theory
of a "government of laws, and not of men" 9 in pursuit of an unprincipled, result-directed jurisprudence. Thus, we search for principles in
the hope that they will serve as a constitutional anchor; otherwise we
drift on the vast sea of equal protection, subject to the tides of the latest
opinion polls and the cross-currents of whimsical individualistic notions.
We acknowledge, of course, that each Supreme Court Justice, even
within the range of principled anchorage, holds a powerful oar with
which to steer a broad course, chartered according to personal political,
economic, social, governmental, and philosophical compasses. We rest
easier if we believe that the personal predilection of a Justice is constrained by some decisional principle. The constraint, however, may be
subject-in practical terms, perhaps-only to a Justice's intellectual
honesty, strength of conscience, or urge to candor. Lawyers do not customarily argue at the bar, "Your Honors may do with this case
whatever you please."'" The custom is to argue, "The principle announced in the Doe v. Roe case controls the decision" or "is applicable
in this case." Lawyers draw analogies and synthesize principles
favorable to their cause from prior cases, and distinguish contrary principles. By hypothesis, if we jettison all principles, we also must cast
overboard our capacity to predict, to analyze, or even to argue great
constitutional cases.
The foundation of Brown may rest on a mutable principle-such as
the preponderance of the evidence arising out of sociological data
showing Plessy'g debilitating effect for the nation and its injurious effects on blacks who were segregated by laws enacted by a racist white
power structure. 1 If so, then we can see that Brown's premise will begin to erode the very moment that Brown itself is perceived to produce
debilitating effects in the nation. I2 This would occur when some blacks
agitate for "community control" of schools; when other blacks view
even all-black schools as preferable to cross-town busing of black chil8. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
9. Justice Marshall sought to preserve this "high appellation" in Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 CRANCH) 137, 163 (1803).
10. This is true notwithstanding thatprivately a lawyer might express an ironic, but realistically-based acknowledgement of the nearly final power of the Court. See R. KLUGER, supra note
3, at 643, attributing to then civil rights lawyer Thurgood Marshall this comment on the Supreme
Court's lack of decisional constraints: "White bosses, you can do any thing you want, 'cause you
got de power!'"
11. Eg., J. WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE, THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL
INTEGRATION: 1954-1978, at 4 (1979).
12. For an overview treatment of resistance to Brown and the nearly insurmountable
problems of implementing the decision, see J. WILKINSON, supra note 11.
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dren to isolated majority white schools;' 3 or when apostles of "black
pride" disdain integration as such, and seek instead to draw together in
black self-uplift. 4 In such circumstances as these, the desire for black
separation could not be viewed as one imposed by a dominant white
society, which might be seen-erroneously, I submit-as the evil inherent in the segregation Brown declared unlawful.
Happily, this scenario remains a mere hypothesis,' 5 but there is reason to be troubled about Brown. This is not because its result was
wrong, but because as a basis for future decision-making, its principles
were then unclear, and remain unclear. 6 The ghost of Brown's inadequate rationale stalks the corridors of the Supreme Court building each
time the Court confronts the contemporary issue of race. It roams
through the briefs of today's equal protection advocates. Stealthily, it
makes mischief with decisions on racial equal protection and confounds our attempts to analyze, to distinguish, and to synthesize the
cases on race and equal protection.' 7
The first question today concerns this paradox: Brown created a
"right" result on a flimsy, even "unprincipled" basis, while in other
cases a doctrinally neat, "neutrally principled" approach has spawned
wrong, even bizarre results.' 8 Justice White himself wrote one of these
major cases 19 and nurtured bad progeny.
The second question today focuses on the irony that the contemporary manifestation of the great "color question" is not pushed by the
advocates of a newer or more expansive equal protection. Yesterday's
theorists of an expansive equal protection today are on the defensive.
They have bunkered down to hold the line against a wave of neoconservatives who ride under the unfurled banner of "reverse discrimination" and who would push the line backwards. It reaches ineffable
13. Bell, Waiting on the Promise of Brown, 39 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 341 (1975), notes
the various positions of blacks who question integration-oriented assumptions.
14. See J. WILKINSON, supra note 11,at 45-49.
15. See, e.g., Stell v. Savannah-Chatham Bd. of Educ., 333 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1964), rev'g 220
F. Supp. 667 (S.D. Ga. 1963). This case clearly shows the judiciary's conviction in effectuating the
purpose of Brown.
16. See Wechsler, supra note 8, at 22 n.72, citing post-Brown cases decided per curiam that
applied Brown in non-school contexts without articulating a rationale.
17. The question is not whether Brown's rationale is unclear, nor whether the remedy in the
subsequent case of Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955), was wise and justifiable or has
been proved by subsequent history to have been more in the way of "deliberate" than in "speed."
See, e.g., R. WILKINSON, supra note 11, at 61-77.

18. See text accompanying notes 60-63 infra for a discussion of Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), a case with a "principled"
approach but a bizarre result.
19. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). See text accompanying notes 56-59 infra for a
discussion of this case.
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irony that DeFunis,0 Bakke,2 and "sons of Bakke"-Weber2 2 and Fulliove 23 -now seek to hammer the shields of "equal protection" into
swords to cut off the descendants of slave plowmen from the "protection" that originally must have been intended to shelter the former
slaves from racist subjugation.2 4 One does not need to be a very
thoughtful person to ponder how this spectre now comes to haunt us.
It might be argued that the Bakkes of America are reacting naturally
to over reaching by black Americans in their quest for equality. On the
contrary, I submit that the plant that grows today in the hands of the
DeFunis/Bakke/Weber/Fullilove unholy25 quartet was planted at the
inception of the Supreme Court's treatment of the equal protection
clause. The seed was germinated (assuredly unwittingly) by the first
Justice Harlan in his classic and eloquent dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson. 2 6 It found nurture and comfort in Brown, and grew to a fledgling
plant in Keyes v. SchoolDistrictNo. 1.27 By the pen of Justice White it
was fertilized and watered.2 8
The HistoricalPremise
What Congress meant when it framed the equal protection clause
will perhaps never be settled, and I do not pretend to add to the knowledge in that area. Suffice it to say that whatever Congress intended, the
Supreme Court set about rendering the equal protection clause-indeed the entire fourteenth amendment-practically meaningless insofar as blacks could rely on it to achieve any real measures of equality.
In the Civil Rights Cases,2 9 the Court said that Congress lacked power
20. Defunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973), appealdismissedasmoot, 416
U.S. 312 (1974).
21. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
22. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
23. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
24. See, e.g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), for the Court's early discussion of the
original intent of the framers of the fourteenth amendment. See also Frank & Munro, The Original Understandingof "EqualProtection of the Laws," 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 421.
25. These cases have a debilitating effect on the scope and purpose of the equal protection
clause, which is to provide every person an opportunity to be dealt with equally in the eye of the
law.
26. 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See quote accompanying note 31 infra.
27. 413 U.S. 189 (1973). See text accompanying note 38 infra.
28. See text accompanying notes 56-59 infra.
29. 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
[The fourteenth amendment) does not invest Congress with power to legislate upon subjects
which are within the domain of State legislation; but to provide modes of relief against State
legislation, or State action [which impairs the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States]. It does not authorize Congress to create a code of municipal law for the
regulation of private rights; but to provide modes of redress against the operation of State
laws, and the action of State officers executive or judicial, when these are subversive of the
fundamental rights specified in the amendment.
Id. at 11.
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to enact general laws to protect black citizens from racial discrimination. It would seem, afortiori, that if the equal protection clause did
not give Congress the power to protect against private acts of subjugation, whereby blacks might on their own achieve some measure of
equality, then the post-Reconstruction Court must have perceived that
Congress could have no role in advancing equality for the black race
by positive legislative thrusts.30 It must follow, then, that the "equal"
part of the equal protection clause must have been understood to mean
something other than "equal" from the very beginning.
Justice John Marshall Harlan explained how things can be equal but
yet not equal. Dissenting in Plessy, he casually blended his views
against state-imposed racial segregation with notions reflecting unadulterated white supremacy:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country.
And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in
power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it remains
true to its great heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional liberty. But in the view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law,
there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens
Our Constitution is color-blind. . . .'
Thus, even the black man's most ardent friend on the Court at that
time, less than a generation after the end of slavery, was willing to
blink the deprivations slavery had visited upon the black race, and to
conditionally envision the black man's perpetual degradation and inferiority. He did so by erecting a clear dichotomy between equality in
fact and a constitutionally sufficient equality. In other words, the Constitution was to be "color-blind," notwithstanding that slavery and segregation were pre-eminently color-sighted. In his historical context,
mortals may be inclined to exonerate Justice Harlan, but enduring
moral and ethical judgments do not show such charity.
In this context we have no trouble recognizing the unspeakable dilemma that confronted the Brown Court. Given the potential explosion in reaction to a decision for the black plaintiffs in Brown and given
the real or perceived dangers to the Court as an institution, 32 it is understandable that the Court did not explain the result on any principled
or doctrinally neat ethical or moral ground. The clearest principle
30. The idea of "general equality" as used here bridges the rather curious distinctions that
might be suggested between "political," "social," and even "civil" equality. For further discussion, see Frank & Munro, supra note 23, at 448-51.
31. 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896).
32. See J. WILKINSON, supra note II, at 29-34, 51-52, 72-77. It was perceived that the South
might rebel against or completely disregard the decision of the Court, or rebel against the black
plaintiffs in the case by methods which the Court could not control. Either of these reactions was
perceived as potentially fatal to the Court's credibility as an institution which has the power to
"interpret the law" and apply it in all states of the United States.
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would have been to declare that equal protection required equality in
fact in the educational opportunity afforded to black children-not because separate was unequal, but because unequal was unjust and immoral. Undoubtedly, that was unthinkable because no such egalitarian
ideal was manifested on the Court or in whatever may have been the
intention of the framers of the equal protection clause.
Brown's rationale was murky. It spoke of state-imposed unequal
segregation itself as the evil. This rationale pushes rather inexorably to
the logical conclusion that there is a constitutional value in going to
interated schools; that is, that there exists a constitutional value in
mixing the races in the schools. It is doubtful that there was, or is, any
serious proponent of that point of view. 33 If there had been some practical way to implement the "equal" part of Plessy, history shows quite
clearly that the thrust toward an attack on segregation itself would
likely have been forestalled, 34 and Brown might never have arisen.
Thus, the attack on segregation itself became a last ditch, and somewhat desperately chosen surrogate for a thrust toward equal education
in terms of material and human resources. The logic was that the ingenuity of white supremacists in forestalling, equality in fact between
black and white schools was so inexhaustible that the only real answer
was for blacks to go to the same schools; that is, to go to school with
white supremacists' children. That the Court's doctrine even suggested
that the sociological data and the social scientists' dolls were relevant to
the true issues in the case 35 strikes us today as unusual and contrived
and, especially with hindsight, as a curious constitutional decisionmaking methodology.3 6
Consistency in the Denialof Equality in Fact and
Principles of Morality
Brown at least said that segregated schools were "inherently unequal."'37 Why is that not an affirmation of the egalitarian ideal of
equality? The answer lies in the nature of the issues framed in Brown.
In truth, mere segregation was never at issue. The issue before the
Court was whether the states' intentional imposition of unequal education on the basis of race violated the equal protection clause. The issue
33. Perhaps the closest approximation of that idea is the so-called "diversity" criterion cited
by Justice Powell in Bakke, but he cites diversity for its educational value and not for its intrinsic
or constitutional significance. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-19 (1978).
34. See generally R. KLUGER, supra note 3.
35. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
36. Absolutely no disparagement of the work of the social scientists, especially that of Dr.
Kenneth B. Clark, is intended. That work was rendered essential because of the Court's limited
doctrinal development. The point is that the Court's doctrine should never have made such data
necessary or relevant.
37. 347 U.S. at 495.
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thus had three distinct elements. First, the segregation was intentional.
Second, it was unequal. Third, it was premised on race. Thus, the issue
of unequal education in the absence of intentional state conduct was
not presented. Nor was the issue of educational quality qua quality
raised. Finally, the question of unequal education, even if intentionally
imposed, but on some basis other than race-such as geography or
family income-was not raised.
In all the cases that I can find in which the Court has addressed
education, but in which all three Brown elements were not present, the
Court has refused to find a violation of equal protection. For example,
under Keyes v. School District No. 1,38 there is no right to a nonsegregated education, but merely the more limited right to an education that
the state has not intentionally caused to be unequal and
segregated on
40
39
the basis of race. This is the difference between de jure and de facto
segregation. Only the former violates equal protection.4 ' Justice White
did not participate in Keyes although he evidenced his approval of the
result in subsequent opinions.42 There is also no constitutional right to
equal education independent of one's economic status. This was made
clear in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez. 43 Justice
White, joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan, dissented because he
was unable to find a rational basis in the intentional tax scheme for
school funding that the State of Texas had established, and called the
scheme "invidious" discrimination." This was unquestionably one of
his finer hours. But he had to make no major departure from the overall analytical construct to reach his conclusion. He stopped far short of
the egalitarian ideal of equality in fact--that is, equality apart from
conduct intentionally creating the inequality.
Thus it seems clear that under the present state of the law there is no
constitutional right to equal education nor to desegregated education
where the inequality or segregation is perceived to flow from geo38. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
39. De jure segregation refers to segregation intended or mandated by law or by official action through race classifications.
40. De facto segregation refers to segregation that is a result of social, economic, or other
determinants, and includes all but segregation that is de jure.
41. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Alexander v.
Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430
(1968).
42. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (White, J., majority opinion); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (White, J., joining J. Stewart's majority opinion).
43. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
44. Id. at 68. According to Justice White, "Requiring the State to establish only that unequal
treatment is in furtherance of a permissible goal, without also requiring the State to show that the
means chosen to effectuate that goal are rationally related to its achievement, makes equal protection analysis an empty gesture." Id.
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graphic living patterns, even those which are intentionally caused or
used by the states or their political subdivisions. A synthesis of Rodriguez and Keyes forces this conclusion. Finally, segregated education is
not unconstitutional where the racial segregation results from separate
actions of independent local political jurisdictions, if those jurisdictions
have not acted with the provable intention of causing the unequal segregation. This is the essence of Milliken v. Bradley.45
Justice White dissented in Milliken, albeit on a narrow ground: the
proven "deliberate acts" of racial segregation in one political subdivision would go unremedied unless other political subdivisions were encompassed within the scope of the remedy ordered.46 He did not
broach, nor did he need to broach, the egalitarian issue of a right to a
desegregated education independent of any "deliberate acts" of the
state that caused the unequal segregation. He made no hint that the
unequal quality of education in the City of Detroit could itself raise an
issue of equal protection, although he recognized the State of Michigan's ultimate responsibility for education and its responsibility under
the fourteenth amendment. His views were premised on an acceptance
of the Keys de jure/de facto distinction, and he seemed untroubled
that equal education as a right independent of intentional racial segregation did not raise equal protection issues.
The education and equal protection cases are, I think, the paradigm
cases that could have raised the egalitarian principle of a moral and
ethical basis for constitutional policy-making. Yet, even these cases
have not raised the issue of equality qua equality to a level of constitutional consciousness warranting express discussion by the Court. The
true egalitarian idea must not have even crossed the judicial mind.
The equal protection clause is the one clause in the Constitution
upon which the egalitarian principle most logically can be founded.
The Court's refusal to erect such a principle has been consistent and
clear, however. Having refused to do so in the education cases, it is not
surprising that the Court has rejected the equality principle in other
areas. In Lindsey v. Normet4 8 the Court was called upon to strike down
the imposition of differential burdens premised on one's housing status.
Although race was not involved, the Court declined to declare housing
a fundamental right that could not be burdened by limitations that
45. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
46. Id. at 780. Justice White supported the multi-district remedy ordered by the district court
judge. ld. at 780.
47. See notes 39-40 supra.
48. 405 U.S. 56 (1972). In Normet, when the city declared rental property unfit for habitation, the owner refused to make specified repairs. When the lessee then refused to pay rent, the
owner threatened eviction. The lessee then sought a declaratory judgment that the Oregon Forcible Entry and Wrongful Detainer statute was unconstitutional.
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were not also applied to other kinds of interests. Justice White, writing
for the Court, pointed out emphatically and cryptically:
We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe, and sanitary
housing. But the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for
every social and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in that document any constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular
quality . ...
In announcing that view, Justice White strayed at large and far beyond the issue presented in the case. The issue was a narrow one
which, when reduced to its essence, was whether, under the equal protection clause, state-imposed burdens affecting a person's interest in not
being evicted from housing should be weighed on the same judicial
analytical scale as those burdens, for example, that were placed on supermarkets which offered trading stamps.5 0
That Justice White did not stop with the issue of the case is significant. In suggesting that there are no constitutional remedies for all "social and economic ills," the Justices echoed the distinction made by
Justice Harlan in his dissent in Plessy: there is a difference between
equal protection and equality in fact. And even that was an echo of the
Civil Rights Cases5 of 1883. The Justices seemed to be warning litigants, somewhat gratuitously, to stop pushing. But they would not stop.
The Coming of DoctrinalNeutrality and the Death of
the EgalitarianNotion
The notion that the Constitution should protect an egalitarian ideal
has not died an easy death. Indeed, the ghost of Brown continues to
roam at large, and in the shadows of Brown's penumbra, it is easy to
mistake mirages for images of egalitarianism. The words "segregated
schools are inherently unequal" are so evocative that it is easy to forget
that Brown was premised on the concurrent existence of three elements:
state intent, racial segregation, and inequality.
Like a drowning person in Brown's muddled sea, we grabbed at
straws. Griggs v. Duke Power Co.52 floated into our grasp. There, we
perceived, was the case that could be used to undergird Brown with the
egalitarian principle. Did Griggs not hold that a device which adversely affects a disproportionate number of minorities is unlawful, at
49. Id. at 74.
50. See Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis, 240 U.S. 342 (1916) (special license tax on merchants
using profit sharing coupons and trading stamps withstood equal protection challenge on the basis
that "facts reasonably can be conceived" to sustain the distinction between merchants that used
the coupons and those that did not).
51. 109 U.S. 3, 13 (1883).
52. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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least unless it is shown that the device is demonstrably necessary? 53
Although Griggs permitted inequalities caused by "necessary" disqualification devices, and although purists were quick to perceive that imperfection in the Griggs principle from an egalitarian standpoint,
54
practical analysts could see a measured step in the right direction.
Practicality-which might pejoratively be described as expediencysuggests that one must use what is available, and Griggs, at least, was
available. Less optimistic souls recognized that Griggs was based on
the congressional policy found in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964."1 But, the hope was that the Court would read this contemporary
pronouncement into the equal protection clause.
Justice White demonstrated how wrong that idea was in Washington
v. Davis. 6 He clarified what Brown arguably had left unclear, and
now it was painfully clear. Equality had no constitutional place in and
of itself. Equal protection for blacks is a more limited right-a right
not to be caused to be unequal only by state conduct taken for the purpose of causing blacks to be unequal.
The conduct may be intentional. That is of no moment. Presumably
the making of the employment test in Washington v. Davis could not
have been other than intentional: it was not inadvertent; it was not
fortuitious; it was not accidental that the test was developed.
The result may be unequal. That, too, is of no moment. The evidence of the disproportionate disqualification in Washington v. Davis5 7
was not challenged. Even intentional conduct which produces inequality is not subject to the prohibition of the equal protection clause.
Plainly, the intent with which the Court is concerned must be of a very
specific variety bespeaking animus and motivation against blacks.
The true egalitarian principle was buried by Washington v. Davis and
Justice White was clear about that matter: "[W]e have difficulty understanding how a law establishing a racially neutral qualification. . . is
nevertheless racially discriminatory and denies 'any person. . . equal
protection of the laws' simply because a greater proportion of Negroes
fail to qualify ... ."58 To put it another way, Justice White is telling
us that mere inequality is of no constitutional significance. He has told
us we may not cite mere equality as a constitutional right. We must
press our cases by urging that racial inequality was the intent or the
purpose of the state's action in undertaking the challenged conduct.
53. Id. at 431.
54. See generally Lerner, Employment Discrimination: Adverse Impact, Validivy and Equality,
1979 Sup. CT. REV. 17.
55. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1974 (1976).
56. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
57. Id. at 242.
58. Id. at 245.
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The principle of Washington v. Davis is clear. It is a neutral principle. It requires no sociological data as its base. It is not mutable. The
principle is independent of any facts appearing in the record. The
Court does not have to find any constitutional facts to announce the
principle. Only racial inequality caused by conduct intended to produce that inequality is violative of equal protection. That at least is a
firmer principle than Brown enunciated.
It is also a principle which is unworkable. It shields vast areas of
conduct, not because the purpose of the conduct is innocent, but because in reality plaintiffs are unable to prove that illicit intent or purpose.
Justice White, however, was not unmindful that his principle
presented practical difficulties. He pointed out: "Necessarily, an invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from the totality of
the relevant facts, including the fact. . . that the law bears more heavily on one race than the other."59
The hope that this statement raised, however, was dashed by the
Court in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp .60 In that case the Court found that intent or purpose failed
of proof, notwithstanding that plaintiffs proved intentional conduct
(zoning) which did "arguably bear more heavily on racial minorities."'" The proof of disproportionate impact was examined to determine whether such impact raised an inference of intent or purpose to
cause the inequality, because, as demonstrated, inequality alone was
not constitutionally significant.6 2
Applying the intent or purpose test laid down by Justice White in
Washington v. Davis, the Court in Arlington utterly ignored that the
zoning had been intentionally undertaken and that it would inevitably
result in a disproportionate exclusion of blacks. The Court also ignored the widespread existence of racial inequality and exclusion
throughout suburban America. It held that discriminatory intent or
purpose had not been even inferentially shown.6 3 This is a description
of a result that might well be called bizarre. But even if the result may
not be so described, the fact that the proof of constitutional rights depends upon the dunderheadedness with which the inequality is caused
is assuredly a bizarre constitutional decisional methodology. It is bizarre because only the more neanderthal defendants are likely to leave
the telltale evidence necessary to prove intent or purpose. It is bizarre
59. Id. at 242.
60. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
61. Id. at 269.
62. It should be noted that Justice White dissented in Arlington on an procedural ground not
pertinent to this discussion. Id. at 272.
63. Id. at 270.
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because the realistic process of vindicating a constitutional right correlates inversely with the degree of sophistication practiced by the person
denying that right. In other words, the methodology puts a premium
on sophisticated conduct designed to discriminate.
Thus, although Brown was flimsily rationalized, it produced the ethically and morally correct result on its facts and left alive at least the
possibility of arguing the egalitarian principle. But Washington v. Davis, with its constitutionally neat principle, produced the wrong result
on its facts, is practically unworkable, and leaves no possibility of arguing the egalitarian notion.
The Contemporary Great ConstitutionalIssue of Race.Sustaining Legislative Equality Thrusts
The times have always been hard for black Americans. Throughout
the years powerful forces in the nation have begrudged each and every
incremental advance toward the realization of the egalitarian ideal.
When the legislatures made even small responses, as with the Reconstruction laws, the Court has undone the effort. We are fearful that
when legislatures respond today to the insistent demand for protection
and take some small measure to enhance the egalitarian thrust, the
Court may again undo them at the instance of "reverse discrimination"
litigation. Indeed, the great contemporary issue of race is not how to
thrust toward the egalitarian ideal (which, as already demonstrated,
was never a true egalitarian thrust); the great issue on the contemporary stage is how to hold the line. As with the post-Reconstruction
legislation, we may yet endure another hundred-year setback and be
forced to start again at the bottom of the climb toward the egalitarian
summit. We must resist this attempt to make us the modem day Sisyphus.
The literature abounds on this issue. The press and scholarly journals are full of it.' Blacks and their diminishing rank of friends65 today confront a compounded irony: first, energies must be waged
fending off this rearguard assault instead of advancing on the egalitarian front; second, notions somehow got afoot that inspired this assault
and provided the implements to the DeFunis-Bakke-Weber-Fullilove
crew.
Think of Justice Harlan's "color-blind" Constitution as something of
64. For one collection of references to both sources, see J. WILKINSON supra note 11.
65. Of those who filed amici curiae briefs urging affirmance in Bakke, some had helped previously make up the rank and file in support of the black man's fight for civil rights in the 1960's.
These included the American Federation of Teachers, the American Jewish Committee, the AntiDefamation League of B'nai Brith, and the Queens Jewish Community Council. Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 269 (1978).
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a doctrinal starting point. If we add to that both a racism-tainted legacy and the doctrinal tools developed to deal with it, the manner in
which this double irony arose may become clearer.
If one examines almost any of the de jure school desegregation decisions (or for that matter the pre-Defunis racial equal protection
cases), 66 one sees that the racial animus inherent in segregation was
clearly designed to perpetuate the subjugation of black Americans. It
seems rather natural, therefore, to view racial classifications as odious,
suspicious, and mean. In that context, the doctrine that racial classifications are suspect seems beneficial and helpful. It is not surprising,
therefore, that equal protection advocates for black advancement could
67
applaud Justice White's opinion in 1965 in McLaughlin v. Florida,
which applied what had by then become established constitutional doctrine: racial classifications were "constitutionally suspect" and "in
most circumstances irrelevant. '6 In McLaughlin the Court struck
down a state statute that placed higher criminal penalties on interracial
fornication than on fornication generally. So, too, in 1967 we could
applaud when, in Reitman v. Mulkey, 69 the Court affirmed the decision
of the California Supreme Court that struck down Proposition 14,70
which had repealed antidiscrimination laws and had prohibited the
state from enacting any law outlawing racial discrimination in real
property transactions. We were not troubled when Justice White, writ71
ing for the Court, said that "the purpose, scope and operative effect"
of the law should be examined, nor were we troubled when he approved the California court's examination of the "intent" of Proposition 14. We may also have applauded Justice White's opinion for the
Court in Hunter v. Erickson,72 which reiterated the "race as a suspect
classification" approach in striking down a mandatory referendum requirement for any ordinance dealing with, among other things, racial
discrimination in housing.73
Against the evils the Court then confronted, these views seemed ethically principled and morally sound. How could we have anticipated
66. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Educ., 383 U.S. 663
(1966); Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964).
67. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
68. Id. at 192.
69. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
70. As it appeared in the state-wide ballot, Proposition 14 read, in part:
Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit or abridge, directly
or indirectly, the right of any person, who is willing or desires to selL lease or rent any part or
all of his real property, to decline to sell, lease or rent such property to such person or persons
as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses.
Proposition 14 became Art. I, § 26 of the state constitution. 387 U.S. at 370-71.
71. 387 U.S. at 374.
72. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
73. Id. at 391-93.
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that in the hands of a DeFunis, a Bakke, or a Fullilove they could be
turned against a thrust toward an egalitarian ideal when legislatures
enacted laws or states or their agencies undertook small, incremental
measures to foster some small measure of equality in fact?
First, we must remember that the federal and state governments provide "preferences" to all sorts of people and interests. They enact tax
benefits and loopholes; they provide subsidies to businesses, professions, and industries. Educational institutions "discriminate" in favor
of children from wealthy families (in the hope of present or future
gifts); they discriminate in favor of athletes and children of alumni, and
on the basis of geography. Yet the contemporary issue of "reverse discrimination" arises only when a state or state educational institution
makes a preference for the black race. Only then do we hear the
anguished cry. The DeFunises and Bakkes of America have not raised
the awful cry against the smorgasbord of preferences served up in
academia. No. They decry race, and that alone. The Webers and the
Fulliloves do not challenge accelerated business tax write-offs; they do
not assail the preferences represented in the subsidies to trucking companies, banks, railroads, and conglomerates. The Webers and Fulliloves have not raised the awful cry against the cafeteria of
governmental preferences. No. They decry race, and that alone.
There are, I submit, at least three reasons for challenging preferences
for blacks. First, too many segments of white America are motivated
by an anti-black animus." Second, if whites tried to litigate any of the
above nonracial preferences and discriminations as violating the equal
protection clause, they would be sent packing on the strength of a quick
"rational basis" analysis.75
The third reason is more complex, and constitutes the ultimate irony.
In developing the analytical methodology for employing the equal protection clause as a shield to guard blacks against racist subjugation, the
Court has provided handy tools to neoconservatives, reactionaries, and
racists with which they can assault any egalitarian measures that blacks
might be able to extract from the political process.
It is curious beyond expression that the Bakkes find the tools to attack the meager legislative and political progess that blacks are making
toward the egalitarian ideal in the very same laws, and interpretations
of those laws, that were enacted to protect the black citizens of this
country from racist subjugation. Is it not ironic that Bakke could use
74. See, e.g., NAT'L COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT (1968). See also Kushner,
Apartheid in America An Historicaland LegalAnalysis of ContemporaryRacial Residential Segregation in the United States, 22 How. L.J. 545 (1979).
75. For a discussion of the "rational basis" decisional methodology, see Gunther, Foreward"
In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court-.A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972).
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the equal protection clause and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to fashion
his sword to cut back the entry of a paltry sixteen blacks to the medical
school at the University of California? Is it not, but for its seriousness,
so ironic as to be laughable7 6 that Fullilove could use the equal protection clause as his sword to try to slice away the ten percent minority
enterprise set-aside77 in the four billion dollar Public Works Employment Act of 1977?
In order to sustain the race-conscious measures under attack, in both
Bakke and Fullilove the Court had to retreat from Justice John Marshall Harlan's eloquent idea that the Constitution was color-blind.78
Justice White concurred in Bakke with Justices Brennan, Marshall,
and Blackmun that the Constitution was not color-blind. 7 9 But the
idea did not die an easy death. Justice Powell, the "swing man," held
fast, and cited Justice White's decision in McLaughlin v. Florida8" for
support of the proposition that any race classification was a "suspect
classification."'" Justice Blackmun agreed too that any race was a suspect classification and offered his hope that the affirmative action programs he apparently reluctantly voted to sustain would be necessary for
only "a decade at most."8 2 If he honestly believes that three centuries
of degradation will be wiped away in a decade, Justice Blackmun must
be the most optimistic man on the face of the earth.
In Fullilove, Justices Burger, White, and Powell flatly rejected the
contention that the Constitution was color-blind. 3 That it took seven
Justices in two opinions to put an idea that was never the law in its
grave, bespeaks its vitality. Whether its ghost will come back to haunt
us cannot be determined.
But the problems are not difficult to imagine. Color-blindness is a
neutral ideal. Without a legacy of racism and white supremacy in
America, it would serve as a solid and strong anchor against the riptides of reaction and personal judicial whim. But in casting adrift from
the color-blindness ideal are we left with any strong neutral principles
by which to steer? If not, what ideal shall we use to argue the great
cases that may arise if the neoconservative onslaught, although having
lost four rounds in the DeFunis, Bakke, Weber, and Fullilove quartet,
76. Here I do not invoke "one of the sovereign perogatives of philosophers-that of laughter," Black, The Lawfulness ofthe Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421,424 (1960), not because
I deny the prerogative to philosophers, but because I think any advocate of a broader equality
could appreciate the humor if not overawed by its grave implications.
77. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6735 (1976 & Supp. I 1979).
78. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1895) (Harlan J., dissenting).

79. 438 U.S. 265, 369 (1977).
80. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
81. 438 U.S. 265, 306-08 (1978).
82. Id. at 403.
83. Fullilove v. Klutznick 448 U.S. 448 (1981).
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takes to the political process and starts to undo the legislative and political thrusts blacks have made toward the egalitarian ideal in the affirmative action programs? 4
The practical dilemmas we shall face are these: First, if we seek to
use DeFunis, in which the Washington Supreme Court employed the
traditional suspect classifications analytical methodology, how long can
we sustain the burden of proving that it constitutes a "compelling state
interest" to upgrade the black race against a continually receding history of de jure discrimination? How long can we hurdle the high wall
of "strict scrutiny"-which was erected, ironically, to protect us from
subjugation-when the question becomes our own alleged unfair advantage? How long can we meet the burden of pursuing egalitarianism
in a nation that has never constitutionally committed itself to that
ideal?
Second, if we seek to use the Bakke/Fullilove analysis, I fear we shall
find them based on mutable principles, not "neutral" ones. In critical
ways they are premised on factual findings which seem to have independent constitutional significance. Each is premised on data which
is changeable and shifting in the degree to which prior discrimination
has disadvantaged the black race in America. It is not unforeseeable
that reactionary studies in the future will assert that disadvantages we
blacks then claim are attributable to our own personal follies, individually or collectively, or to our own innate inferiority, and not to any
prior discrimination against us.
Third, we can take no comfort at all in Weber because it was premised on the legislative intent in Title VII. By hypothesis, we will have
lost the legislative and political battle before the onslaught can begin in

earnest.
Should this scenario come to pass, we will have come full circle, and
we will stare the ghost of Brown in the eye: the ghost of unprincipled

constitutional policy-making. It will haunt us and our quest for equality once again.
The ChallengingProspectsfor the Future
If there is any clear way to avoid the paradoxes and ironies that attend constitutional policy-making while we try to advance the cause of
equality, it is not readily apparent. That, then, is the challenging prospect: to seek, to discover, and to develop workable constitutional prin84. Absent some principle, the argument largely resolves to a less weighty one of sheer need
or desire, or group advantage. That has neither much ethical force nor moral bearing. Indeed,
absent principle, Professor Wechsler is right: one is essentially addressing a political or power
question. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 14
(1959).
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ciples that can be used to advance the egalitarian ideal, without at the
same time forging handy tools for reactionaries to use against that
ideal. That is the ultimate, great challenge that history grants us.
In the interim we must, again, use what we have available to hold the
line. The prospect is not utterly bleak, but it is mighty dark. Among
the hopeful sparks I discern are these:
First, we may yet convince the Court, at another time, with different
Justices, that the fact of inequality itself raises an equal protection issue. Tirelessly, we should attempt to analyze, to synthesize, and to distinguish cases in search of clear and persuasive ideas that, pieced
together, suggest the egalitarian principle.
Second, the purpose and intent analysis of Justice White in Washington v. Davis, which seems so problematic today, may be capable of
being pressed into service, at least to ward off the onslaught. There are
inklings to be found in the cases that suggest this possibility. 85 I refer,
for example, to Justice White's opinion in United Jewish Organizations
v. Carey86 upholding race conscious redistricting.
Third, Justice White's opinion in Reitman v. Mulkey8 7 may be useful
in holding off a complete undoing of affirmative action that is already
in place. The notion that laws may not be repealed if to do so would
encourage discrimination may be developed to hold back the conservatives' urge to abort the affirmative action thrust.
Fourth, Justice White's opinions in the Dayton/Columbus school
cases 88 suggest a basis to argue (at least where evidence shows that
prior intentional segregation has not fully run its course) that there remains a continuing constitutional duty to dismantle the remaining discriminatory effect. How these school cases can be applied in other
contexts is far from clear, but, as noted,8 9 in ways never explained,
Brown was applied to restaurants and buses and a host of non-school
contexts. In addition, there may be grist in a temporally longitudinal
analysis of continuing effects. 9°
Undoubtedly there are as yet unknown and presently unknowable
arguments and strategies that continued in-depth analyses, critical syntheses, astute distinctions, and insightful analogies may yield. The ultimate challenge is to devise a principled basis for the pursuit of the
egalitarian result.
85. Columbus Bd. of Educ..v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman,
443 U.S. 526 (1979).
86. 430 U.S. 114 (1977).
87. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
88. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman,
443 U.S. 526 (1979).
89. See note 50 & accompanying text supra.
90. See generally J. WILKINSON, supra note 11, at 39.
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The one lesson that history assuredly teaches is this: the quest for the
egalitarian ideal is long and hard. Our pursuit of that ideal has been
relentless and untiring. It must continue to be. This is the only thing
we blacks can do, for within the black race in America, the hope of
equality still lives. The dream will never die.
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